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1 Introduction
The  debate on global governance that intensified
at the end of the Cold War reflected the recognition
that accelerating globalisation was creating cross-
border and global problems that could not be solved
within the ambit of nation states pursuing go-it-
alone policies. Rather, these problems needed to
be tackled politically on the basis of new forms of
‘governance beyond the nation state’ (Zürn 1998;
Rosenau 1997; Nye and Donahue 2000; Kennedy
et al. 2002). International financial crises, banking
regulation, global climate change, international
property rights, migration flows, humanitarian
interventions and the fight against transnational
terrorism have increasingly become the objects of
global policy processes, along with continued
concern with long-established questions such as
the international trade regime.
The purpose and goals of global governance are
defined against this background as the ‘development
of a system of institutions and rules as well as of
new mechanisms of international cooperation that
make it possible to deal on a continuous basis with
the problems posed by global challenges and
transboundary phenomena’ (Messner 2000: 284).
The main aim of global governance is to avoid crises
and turbulence within the global system, with an
increasing range of issues seen as potentially
threatening. But global governance amounts to
more than this: it also has developmental objectives.
For much of the 1990s, these were framed as a
neoliberal policy agenda aimed at promoting faster
economic growth through internal and external
liberalisation. Increasing global integration was
seen as a positive factor for economic growth (World
Bank 2002), although the increasing salience of
discussions addressing issues such as “managing
globalisation” or “making globalisation work for
the poor” indicated a perception that globalisation
processes would need to be managed politically if
they were to promote inclusive development.
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The global governance discourse of the 1990s
was geared to strengthening a multilateral world
order and creating new patterns of cooperation
between governmental and private actors. Indeed,
this was the period in which corporations and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) became more
prominent in global governance. Private and public-
private organisations became more important in a
variety of global governance institutions, and in
particular in standards setting around finance, trade,
labour and the environment (Nadvi and Wältring
2004). Scholte (2000: 151) refers to the trend of
private sector actors playing an increasing role in
regulatory activities at the global level as the
“privatisation of governing”.
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Nevertheless, the emergence of a multi-actor, multi-
level global governance system did not appear to
create space for effective participation by developing
countries in global governance institutions (Rodrik
1997; Maggi and Messner 2002). The limited
participation and influence of developing countries
in global governance institutions is often remarked
upon. Even in trade negotiations, which have provided
many opportunities for developing countries to
develop understanding and capabilities, the most
decisive indication of developing country capacity
to frame agendas and stake out positions occurred
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as recently as the negotiations leading up to the Doha
Round. Similarly analyses of developing country
participation in the many fora that define and apply
the technical rules that have such an important impact
on trade frequently point to the limited participation
of developing countries.
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In this context, one concern
of policy-makers has been to enhance the participation
of developing countries in such fora through the
training for negotiators and technical staff and
supporting participation in meetings.
The marginalisation of developing countries in
global fora was exacerbated by the events of 11
September 2001, which shifted the focus of the
discussion to the future of world politics under the
conditions of globalisation. The responses of the US
administration to the attacks in New York and
Washington and the Iraq war have provoked an
intensive discussion over the unilateral world order
in the shadow of the “lone superpower” (Cooper
2003; Daalder and Lindsay 2004; Mead 2004). Many
observers have argued that the US will be the only
global superpower for some time to come. Apart
from the US, it is claimed, there is no other actor in
sight that could exert a comprehensive and sustained
influence on global governance processes (Kagan
2003). If this were true, the developing countries
would no longer have a role to play as effective actors
in international politics and global governance.
And yet, at the moment when discussion over
the “unilateral world order” reaches its peak, a new
debate emerges. This focuses in particular on the
rising power of China and India, as well as a number
of other “anchor countries” like Brazil and South
Africa (Goldman Sachs 2003; Stamm 2004;
Friedman 2005), and it draws our attention to a
new challenge to the global hegemony – of the US
in particular – of the industrially advanced
economies in general.
2 The new power constellation
The “new Asian Drivers of global change” are
becoming global players who are forcefully altering
the relationship between industrialised and
developing countries. The rise of China and India
as both economic and political actors is having, and
will have, significant and far-reaching impacts.
While India is not so prominent in world trade and
finance as China, it has shown sustained growth
for two decades and has good prospects for
sustained growth over the next decade (Rodrik and
Subramanian 2004: 3; Deutsche Bank Research
2005). By 2020 it is likely to be the world’s third
largest economy. It is playing an increasing role in
global governance institutions and in leadership
among developing countries. China’s impact on the
global economy has been more visible. Its share of
total US imports rose from 6 per cent in 1995 to
15 per cent in 2004,
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the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Economic
Survey of China (published in September 2005)
predicts that it will overtake Germany and the US
to become the world’s largest exporter by 2010;
China’s share of the world demand for key base
metals has risen from 5–7 per cent in the early 1990s
to 20–25 per cent at present; it holds the world’s
second largest currency reserves, amounting to over
US$670bn; and China will soon be catching up
with the world’s largest CO2 emitters, on whose
future energy policies the dynamics of global climate
change will hinge in very crucial ways.
The rise of India and China as significant actors
for global governance and the world economy will
transform today’s “quasi-unilateral world order”
into a de facto multipolar power constellation. By
2025–30 at the latest, the US, China, India and
possibly Europe will constitute four substantial
poles of power in the architecture of global
governance. The future interplay among these
central actors of global governance will largely
determine whether and how the transboundary
and global problems of the twenty-first century are
dealt with and what role the world’s developing
regions will be able to play in world politics and
the world economy. This new multipolar power
constellation and the competition for power and
policy options resulting from it will become the
central line of conflict shaping the architecture of
global governance in the coming five decades – in
ways much like the system conflict that dominated
during the Cold War or the endless conflicts
between the Central European powers in the era
leading up to the World War I. The future will be
shaped by “turbulent multilateralism”.
The emergence of China and India as powerful
actors in global governance arenas and in global
politics poses a series of questions for development
policy and the future of global governance. In this
short article, we highlight three areas in which this
challenge will be felt:
●
By the governments of the industrialised countries
as China and India offer development alternatives
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●For the governability of global governance
institutions in a period of multipolar power
constellations
●
By developing countries seeking to prosper in
a period of turbulence and change induced by
the “Asian Drivers of Global Change”.
3 Challenges for the industrialised
world
The current rise of China and India means that two
non-Western countries are becoming weighty actors
in the global system.
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How will the “West” deal with
this state of affairs, particularly given the fact that
these two non-Western societies are home to more
than one-third of the world’s population? Charles
Kupchan, a member of the US Council on Foreign
Relations and an important policy adviser of the
Clinton administration, may have asserted that
“Globalization is Americanization” (Kupchan 2002:
72; emphasis in original), but for how much longer?
And how long will Western countries need to
understand that this coincidence of interests and
power, for years beyond question, might soon
become a thing of the past? For the development
policies of the advanced nations, based on a
consensus of Western nations, China and India
pose big challenges.
One might argue that the rise of China, in
particular, presents a challenge to the development
project of the Western nations, inspired as it has
been by predominantly Christian ideals transmuted
into a secular ideology of human rights and poverty
reduction. Perhaps for the first time since the 1960s
and the heyday of Soviet influence in developing
countries, there is the possibility of an alternative
view of what development is and how to achieve
it. The “Beijing Consensus” (Ramo 2005) is one
expression of this, but not the only one. Kurlantzick
(2005: 28) observes that China is “challenging US
‘soft power’ – the combination of economic vitality,
cultural pull, trade and diplomacy that, as much
as military force, has made the US the pre-eminent
force in the world”. He argues that this is particularly
the case in Asia.
The rise of China means the rise of an
undemocratic, non-liberal state in both the world
economy and in the hierarchy of global governance,
although China may well have to deal with pressures
for democratisation in the coming years. This may
pose problems for the legitimacy of global
governance processes, which of course depend not
least on the legitimacy of the significant actors that
shape them. Will binding worldwide human rights,
social and environmental standards prove even
more difficult to implement and entrench in the
altered context of global governance? For example,
how vulnerable are efforts undertaken in the
framework of international development
cooperation and aimed at advancing democracy
and conflict prevention to targeted attempts to
undercut them? China’s close cooperation and
investments in countries with poor human rights
records – Zimbabwe, Sudan, Algeria (Alden 2005)
– and its close energy partnership with Iran seem
to point to some potential lines of conflict. It can
at the same time be observed that the “Chinese
model” (authoritarian political regime/market
economy) might find some admirers in Africa and
Latin America.
In this respect, the potential posture of China
in global governance is particularly important, as
are the internal political dynamics that might shape
this posture. In many respects, China assumes the
posture of a great power, and it has challenged some
of the core tenets of international development
thinking. It has become markedly more active in
the security field, providing policing support in
Haiti, and peacekeeping troops in Liberia since
2003. It has expressed support for Myanmar and
the Sudan in spite of their poor human rights
records. It has developed more active relationships
with numerous African and Latin American states,
partly because of its economic interests but above
all for access to raw materials for its booming
economy. It has also been more assertive in
geopolitics, staking out positions within the UN
on the future of Iraq. The West will have to learn
to interact with new global powers possessing
growing self-confidence.
More generally, the rise of India and China
presents problems of leverage and influence for
Western donors. Western countries have limited
leverage on China and India. They provide little
foreign aid, and while China and India need close
cooperation with the western countries in areas like
innovation, technology and environmental policies,
which implies interdependency, Western countries
also need access to fast-growing markets and
competitive centres of production and innovation.
The challenge for developed countries is to work
with self-confident and often demanding partners
who cannot be coerced through financial power.
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This leverage (or lack of it) question will be felt
by Western countries as India and China assume
more active roles in global development policy and
in aid.
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They may compete with Western
governments for influence, particularly when
competing for scarce resources, as is being seen in
the geopolitics of resources where China, in
particular, but also India, are seeking cooperation
with developing countries (Venezuela, Sudan, Iran:
energy; Latin America: agricultural products; Africa:
natural resources).
4 Challenges for institutions of
global governance
The thinking of the relevant political actors in China
and India is largely dominated by classic concepts
of sovereignty and the nation state, even though
both countries are fond of making use of multilateral
rhetoric. In comparison, decision-makers in the
industrialised countries, and Europe in particular,
have learnt in the context of ongoing globalisation
debates, global interdependencies and the limits on
the scope for national action that delegation of
sovereignty, for example to the EU, the use of
international cooperation to focus their national
governance resources, and a modified understanding
of the concept of “non-intervention” (e.g. in cases
involving human rights protection vs. non-
interference in internal affairs) are necessary
responses for maintaining the action and problem-
solving capacities of politics in a globalised world.
Interestingly, the classic understanding of sovereignty
and the nation state subscribed to by China and
India coincides fully with the political thinking of
the present US administration. Viewed against this
background, it is easy to understand why China and
India, in the summer of 2005, signed on to the Bush
administration’s “climate initiative”, which is clearly
aimed at undercutting the multilateral Kyoto process
and the ongoing efforts to set clear-cut upper limits
for CO2 emissions. Should these basic political
patterns solidify in the US, China and India, this
would have major implications for the dynamics of
future global governance processes.
Further, even if the world economy reaches a
new configuration, history shows that the adjustment
pressure outlined above will give rise to turbulent
instabilities in the phase of transition to a multipolar
power constellation. One conceivable scenario
would include big-power rivalries between the
established superpower and the new, rising powers.
When, during the Asia crisis of 1997–8, Japan
broached the subject of creating an Asian bank
mandated to stabilise currencies there, Washington
promptly let it be known that the IMF would take
care of the matter. What will happen when China
and India one day start to develop global governance
strategies of their own? Who is to mitigate these
instabilities, to moderate them and direct them into
cooperative channels? Will the US, today’s lone
superpower, prove to be up to this challenge? Could
Europe assume this role, or will it continue to be
concerned mainly with its own internal affairs?
China and India’s new-found willingness to play
global roles will create new challenges for global
governance and governance institutions. China has
in recent years been pursuing clearly discernible
regional strategies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
These appear to be geared chiefly to securing its
supply of raw materials and energy. These processes
are altering the global markets for raw materials and
energy. India too has been playing an increasingly
proactive role in the fields of climate policy and
world trade. In other words, the processes outlined
above are generating adjustment pressure in the
architecture of global governance, giving rise to new
constellations of actors and power. Can anyone even
conceive that in the year 2030, i.e. in the context of
the emerging multipolar power constellation
outlined above, the United Nations, the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the IMF, or the global climate
regime will look the way they do today?
As well as challenging the content of global
governance, the multipolar world will also challenge
governance processes. Established consensuses will
be challenged and the range of influences will be
broadened. This is likely to expose the limitations
of existing practices for managing conflict and
reaching agreements in global governance
institutions. In a multipolar world, informal
mechanisms for establishing consensus (or “deals”)
such as the “Green Room” at the WTO will come
under even more strain (Page 2004: 78). New
alliances may emerge, such as the agreement
between the USA, China, India, South Korea, Japan
and Australia on climate change, signed on 26 July
2005. Both “East” and “West” may fracture or line
up differently on different issues. From this
perspective, a fragmented global governance
architecture, characterised by centrifugal powers,
is much more probable than an inclusive global
governance structure.
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The roles that China and India will play are far
from defined. They will be determined by internal
processes and relationships with other countries.
As rapidly growing and transforming developing
societies, China and India are certainly going to
have to master a number of difficult domestic
adjustment processes (China’s path towards political
liberalisation and how to deal with growing social
polarisation trends; to cite two examples). History
shows that internal tensions often result in
nationalistic, aggressive foreign policy strategies.
Thus, given the growing political weight of China
and India in global politics, the future of global
governance could depend on their internal
governance capacities to manage critical national
transformations (Heberer and Senz 2005
forthcoming). These in turn will have ramifications
for their relationships with developed and other
developing countries.
5 Challenges for developing
countries
The biggest challenges arising from the emergence
of China and India surely face developing
economies. First, there is the question of the rapid
change in global competitive conditions as a result
of the growth of China and India. Because of their
high rates of economic growth, the size of their
economies, and the pace of structural change in
both countries, the rise of both China and
increasingly India, is generating enormous
adjustment pressure in other regions of the world.
Following decades of declining prices for primary
goods, the terms of trade for raw materials and
agricultural goods have, since 2001, been moving
in the opposite direction (Kaplinsky 2005). The
reason: demand pull from China and India. In a
growing number of sectors, Chinese industrial
exports are cutting incisively into the world-market
shares of industrial companies from Latin America
(Dussel 2005) and Africa. The economic dynamics
in the world’s two most populous countries are
leading to significant changes in the world markets
for labour, goods and financial flows.
As other articles in this IDS Bulletin show, the
impacts of India and above all China on developing
economies are very diverse, creating both winners
and losers. Developing country policy-makers need
to understand and respond to the new global
conditions. The winners (particularly energy and
raw materials exporting countries) will have to deal
with the impacts of rising volumes and prices of
exports, while the losers (both raw materials and
energy importers facing rising prices and countries
facing competition from cheap manufactured goods
in both their domestic and export markets) will
face difficult adjustment processes.
The emergence of India and China as
development actors will have further impacts on
developing countries in at least three areas. First,
it might open up new development options for
these countries, most notably in relation to
development options. When Angola wanted a
US$2bn loan, it wanted to avoid the IMF. It went
to China instead, and in return China gained access
to the Angolan oil industry (Alden 2005: 6). Such
interventions may act as a counterweight to
liberalisation agendas pursued by the developed
countries.
Second, China and India have the capacity to
engage in global governance debates and influence
policy formulation, particularly in areas such as the
considerations over trade issues. The increasing
size and competitiveness of their economies may
also create de facto standards setting power. For
example, China has developed its own organic
standard, the Green Food label (IFAD 2005: 9–12).
Similarly, the growth of India and Chinese industrial
enterprises might challenge the hegemony of
Western transnationals in areas of intellectual
property. This shows that they have the capacity,
for example, to participate in technical negotiations
around standards setting, providing an expression
of the needs and priorities of developing countries,
which have often been marginalised. All that might
result in some advantages for other developing
countries – as long as their interests and the interests
of China and India coincide. But at the same time,
the emergency of these two new capable global
standard-setting powers implies for all the standard
takers of the South additional threats to their
national sovereignty.
Third, China and India may introduce
countervailing power to the hegemony of the US-
led Bretton Woods institutions. What might be the
impact of the emergence of China and India as
powerful actors in global governance institutions
on the voice of other developing countries? In this
respect, the critical question is whether India and
China will play the role of advocates in the interests
of the developing countries (as India did within the
G77 group of developing countries), possibly risking
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the emergence of new North–South tensions, or
alternatively will pursue primarily their own
interests, which need not at all coincide with the
interests of the world’s other developing economies?
Developing country participation within global
governance institutions and the activities of lead
nations has often been informed by ideologies of
common interests. India has frequently presented
itself as a leader of the developing world. South
Africa after apartheid and Brazil (particularly since
the election of Lula as president) have consciously
taken up this role. The fact that India, Brazil and
South Africa created in 2003 a democratic G3 of
the South, not integrating China, is a signal that
these countries are proactively trying to play a more
prominent role as non-OECD countries in a world
perceived as G7/G8 driven. They see themselves as
voicing the interests of poor countries. Is this auto-
perception convincing? Such a role need not
preclude the pursuit of self-interest. Brazil is capable
of pursuing pro-poor initiatives in the UN and
voicing a multilateral rhetoric, while simultaneously
adopting regional policies towards Mercosur that
are guided by very clear articulated economic self
interests. It is too early to tell. While China and
India, together with Brazil and South Africa
provided effective leadership of a large group of
developing countries at Cancun in 2003, this
leadership (offered and accepted) may turn out to
have been the exception rather than the rule.
6 Research programme
This brief outline is meant to illustrate the potentially
far-reaching implications and trends of the rise of
China and India in the hierarchy of global
governance. A research programme is needed to
lay bare the precise contours of the terrain of global
change. The first step in a research programme
would be to understand better the postures that
these countries take with regard to global
governance. Relevant dimensions of research and
questions include:
1. Engagement in global governance areas: In which
areas of global governance are the countries
playing proactive roles (agenda-setting capacities;
mobilising other countries, organising voting
blocs, being able to build ad hoc and/or stable
coalitions; spending money in international
affairs; organising global conferences), and in
which fields are their roles more passive? Are
these roles primarily at regional level, or are they
exercised on a global scale? What implications
does this have for other developing countries,
and how should they respond?
2. How do these countries approach international
politics?: (a) expressing narrowly defined national
interests; (b) actively seeking enhancement of
regional leadership roles; (c) actively seeking
global leadership roles within the developing
country grouping; (d) identifying themselves as
leading global actors, irrespective of developing
countries? It seems likely that the desire for
control over essential resources (raw materials
and energy) will be one factor in shaping these
countries’ approaches to international politics.
Will it be the determinant one, and what will
these strategic interests and others adopted by
China and India imply for other developing
countries?
3. How do India and China approach the following
pillars of global governance: (a) cooperative
multilateralism vs. unilateralism; (b) international
system based on rules of law vs. avoiding
international binding rules (e.g. International
Chamber of Commerce – ICC); (c) strong UN
vs. weak UN; (d) regional cooperation and
integration as an answer to globalisation (e.g.
European Union) vs. strategies to strengthen
political power of the dominant countries within
the region (US–Latin America).
4. Patterns of power: Four main forms of power can
be distinguished: (a) power via relations with
other actors (influencing many actors by direct
interaction); (b) the power of being able to
organise cooperation and trust, to convince
others and to be attractive for others (soft power);
(c) institutional power (being able to invest in
global governance institutions, regimes,
standard-setting processes: influencing many
by defining the rules of the game); (d) power via
force/compulsion (be able to force others based
on military power, political dominance, financial
capabilities). Which forms of power do the ‘Asian
Drivers of global change’ use/are they able to
build up?
5. Private actors of global governance: How do these
countries view and deal with the “new” private
actors in world politics? (NGOs on the one hand
and the business sector on the other?) To what
extent are new private actors emerging from
these countries, and what agendas do they have?
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More generally, how do China and India
challenge the power of developed countries and
their transnational companies to set the rules of
international business  – Intellectual Property
Rights, The Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs), etc. – both within
formal global governance institutions and
through de facto exercises of power (e.g. the US
Department of Agriculture’s role as setter of
pharmaceutical standards)? Will such challenges
open up new opportunities for other developing
countries, or pose new threats?
6. The internal politics and policy dimensions: How
do the political elites in both countries perceive
the increasing international importance of their
country, and how is their emerging role in world
politics discussed? What political consensuses
exist within these countries about their positions
within the region and in world politics? Are the
currently guiding approaches dominating in
China and India about their roles as ‘Actors of
Global Change’ fixed or in transition?
7. The internal polity dimension: To be an active and
influential global governance player (a) effective
institutional capacities (ministry of foreign affairs
and other internationally oriented ministries);
(b) strategic capabilities of the diplomatic corps
(global governance school, training of diplomats)
and (c) investments in the research of
international affairs, globalisation processes, etc.
in order to create “soft power capacities”
(universities, think-tanks, publications in this
field) are needed. Are there differences in the
ways that China and India are preparing to play
a significant role in these fields, and how will
their interests and strategies impact upon other
developing countries?
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Notes
1. See, for example, Aninat (2002) and statements from UN
organisations on the need to manage processes of
globalisation.
2. Cited in Higgins and Lawrence (2005: 5).
3. See, for example, Zarrilli’s analysis of the operations of
the Codex Alimentarius Committee (Zarrilli 1999: 15).
4. Source: www.uscc.gov/trade_data_and_analyses/industry
_job_trends/2005/B-95-05-US-X-M-share.pdf
5. Of course, Japan is a non-Western actor on the global
stage, but unlike China and India, it did take on this role
when it was a poor country. It can also be argued that
Japan’s economic weight has not, until recently, been
turned into political clout. Japan has tended to be a timid
and hesitant political actor, unlike China, and increasingly
India.
6. A report in the China Daily emphasises China’s confidence:
‘Chinese President Hu Jintao said in no uncertain terms
last week to the United Nations General Assembly that
China’s rise is a blessing to its neighbours and major trade
powers, is a force of peace for Asia and the world, and
will “not endanger anybody”. Hu spoke out a package of
aid programmes to help the world’s remaining
impoverished countries, Africans especially’ (23
September 2005).
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